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Abstract. This article evaluates the monetary policy transmission through the credit channel 
in a macroeconomic GDP targeting approach with evidence in Cameroon. We use a 
macroeconomic approach based on the time series method. On data from the 1960-2012 
period, statistical tests reveal the existence of successive causality between macroeconomic 
variables of the credit channel, confirming the existence of this channel in Cameroon. The 
Autoregresive vectors modeling (VAR) analysis then reveals a delay of two years in the 
GDP reaction from the monetary impulses, and that the credit channel is narrow with a low 
rate in Cameroon, a central African Developing country.  
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1. Introduction 
rowth in gross domestic product (GDP) is an important objective for 
Cameroon, with a view to its projected economic emergence by the public 
authorities by 2035. In this perspective, the country's economic policy uses 
the budgetary and monetary instruments for an efficient targeting of the global 
production. To achieve this, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommends 
that sub-Sahara African countries improve the transmission of their monetary 
policy to the productive sphere of the economy (IMF, 2014). However, the 
international financial crisis of 2007-2010 has shown that monetary policy is no 
longer entirely satisfactory: the mechanisms of transmission of its effects through 
the credit system no longer function properly (Artus & Broyer, 2014). It is under 
these conditions that the central banks of certain countries (United States of 
America, Japan, European Union) now resort to unconventional monetary policy. 
This policy mobilizes new instruments (quantitative easing, credit easing, etc.) to 
increase the liquidity needed to finance the economy (Artus, 2014). On the 
theoretical level, the old debate on the best channel for transmitting the effects of 
monetary policy is thus revived. 
In the countries of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC), the problem of economic activity financing arises permanently with 
particular acuity. In Cameroon, the evolution of bank lending supply remains 
worrying in light of the growth objectives projected by the public authorities. Less 
than 30% of corporate credit applications are favorably received by banks (IMF, 
2014). In addition, the allocation of credit to the economy by term is unfavorable to 
the financing of productive activities. Out of a total amount of CFAF 2,267.4 
billion in 2013, short-term credit, generally used for commercial activities, 
represents 62 %, i.e. CFAF 1392.6 billion, medium-term credit 33% and long-term 
credit 5% (BEAC, 2013). This bank lending supply remains weak compared to the 
real potential of the economy and the banking system: bank credit represents 8.9% 
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of GDP in Cameroon in 2014, compared with 29.75% in the least developed 
countries, 66.65% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 56.95% in lower-
middle-income countries. Only 17 adults out of 1000 borrow from banks in 
Cameroon (IMF, 2014). This weakness of credit supply contrasts with banking 
liquidity, which accounts for 43% of banking assets in Cameroon, compared to 3% 
in the European Union, 19% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 30% in 
South-East Asia (World Bank, 2014). 
One of the major consequences of this quantitative and qualitative credit 
shortage is the weakness and stagnation of the real growth rate, which is around 
3.52% per year over the period 2005 to 2014 in Cameroon (IMF, 2014). Although 
it reaches 4.8% in 2014, this growth rate remains well below the target of 7% in the 
past two decades, hoping to halve poverty and achieve economic emergence by 
2035. In addition, there is a macroeconomic under-liquidity, with the M2 money 
supply accounting for only 24.8% of GDP. However, in the absence of a well-
functioning financial market, the financing of the Cameroonian economy in 
particular and that of the CEMAC countries in general can not be better done than 
by bank credit. With this in mind, the central Bank of Central African States 
(BEAC) organized an international conference on the financing of CEMAC 
economies on 13 June 2013 in Libreville (Gabon). This conference recommended, 
inter alia: (a) to reformulate the monetary policy of the BEAC to make it more 
effective; (b) to ensure the effectiveness of banking intermediation for more 
appropriate financing of public and private investment by placing the impetus of 
monetary policy of paramount importance. It is in this perspective that we question 
the effective transmission of the effects of the monetary policy of the BEAC to the 
real economy of the countries of the Zone. We are interested in the particular case 
of Cameroon. More specifically, this article aims to evaluate the credit channel in 
Cameroon. In the following, we review the literature (II), the presentation of the 
methodology (III) and the presentation of the results and discussions (IV). 
 
2. Literature Review 
Economic theory recognizes the power of monetary policy to influence the 
supply of bank credit. Each monetary policy decision (change in reserve ratio, 
change in key interest rate, etc.) may lead to a change in the supply of credit to the 
economy by secondary banks (Kashyap & Stein, 1994). The set of successive 
adjustment mechanisms that make this process possible is called the credit channel: 
an expansionary monetary policy (for example) increases the volume of bank 
loans; There is an increase in investment; Resulting in an increase in gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Mishkin et al., 2010). This mechanism for transmitting 
the effects of monetary policy on the real economy is presented in the basic model 
of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) starting from the IS-LM framework of Hicks 
(1937). Bernanke & Blinder (1992), Hubbard (1995), and Stein (1995) 
distinguished the existence condition from the credit channel efficiency condition. 
For the effective existence of this channel, the Central Bank must be able to 
influence the supply of bank credit by using the instruments at its disposal (changes 
in the key rate, the reserve requirement, open market, etc). This requires that, for 
the majority of the economic agents, bank credit and the other means of external 
financing (bonds, shares, etc.) are not substitutable. Otherwise, the credit channel is 
said to be narrow, and channel efficiency is maximal. In an environment of large 
companies able to access other forms of financing in a developed financial system 
(self-financing, bond loans, etc.), the effectiveness of the credit channel is 
diminished and we speak of a broad channel of credit (Lavigne & Villieu, 1996). 
However, everything depends on the behavior of the actors. In order to 
maximize the effectiveness of the credit channel, moral hazard in lender-borrower 
relationships, adverse selection, informational asymmetries, credit rationing and a 
deteriorating business environment must be avoided (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The 
secondary banks must react in such a way as to amplify the effect sought by the 
central bank (Levieuge, 2003). According to Mishkin (1994), the credit channel is 
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measured in terms of width, depth, flow and delay. It is broad if the companies 
have the possibility to finance themselves also in the financial markets, and not 
only with the secondary banks. It is all the wider as the financial market is 
developed. The width of the credit channel is thus measured by comparing the 
share of financing obtained on the stock exchanges (direct financing) with that 
obtained from the secondary banks (indirect financing). The depth of the credit 
channel refers to the credit aggregate most sensitive to monetary policy decisions, 
which is most significantly influenced by monetary policy measures (Goux, 1996). 
Determining the depth of the credit channel thus requires assessing the sensitivity 
to the monetary policy of each credit category (domestic credit, credit to the 
economy, credit to the public sector, etc.), conducting causality tests of Granger 
(1988). 
The flow of the credit channel refers to the degree of response of the supply of 
credit to monetary policy. When it is weak, there is a lack of influence of the 
monetary policy on the banking system and consequently on the real economy 
(Lavigne & Polin, 1996). The credit channel delay is the time it takes for a 
monetary policy decision to have an impact on the real economy. GDP can thus 
react positively with a delay of one or more periods. The credit channel will be all 
the more efficient in that its period will be short. The choice of monetary policy 
instruments always takes into account the delays associated with each one. 
Friedman (1948) distinguishes between two types of deadlines: internal delays (the 
time required to recognize an economic problem, the choice of an instrument and 
its implementation) and external delays (the time needed for an amendment 
Instrument can make its impact on the final objective of the economic policy 
implemented). Between these two types of delay, there are intermediate delays 
which take account of the fact that some instruments do not act directly on the final 
objective but pass through an intermediate variable. In this case, the intermediate 
delay designates the time required between the decision making and the reaction of 
the intermediate variable. 
On the empirical level, work has been carried out on the verification of the 
credit channel. Using the Autoregressive Vector (VAR) method, Gertler & Karadi 
(2015) highlight the credit channel through a monetary policy acting by surprise. 
Some have proved the existence of this canal in the United States (Bernanke & 
Blinder, 1988, 1992; Kashyap & Stein, 1994; Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; Meltzer, 
1995) Month the reaction time of the GDP to the policy of the Federal Reserve 
(Ramey 1993; Romer & Romer, 1993). In the European Union, Beadu & Heckel 
(2001) establish, in line with credit channel predictions, that European firms' 
investment is sensitive to monetary policy, with asymmetries of shocks between 
countries and between firms of different sizes. In a macroeconomic approach, 
Goux (1996) evaluates the credit channel in France using the autoregressive vector 
method (VAR) and finds that real GDP reacts positively to monetary policy with a 
6-month delay, but that a delay of 9 months is necessary to maximize this 
incidence; It identifies credit to the economy as the depth of this credit channel 
whose flow is low. On the African economies, particularly those in West Africa, 
Diagne & Doucouré (2000) estimate the transmission of monetary policy from a 
seven-variable model (real interest rate on the money market, M2, Credit to the 
economy, real exchange rate, GDP, private investment, inflation rate) and find in 
the case of Côte d'Ivoire that a positive shock on the money supply results in 
successive increases in credit to the economy, improved private investment and 
GDP growth (according to the credit channel) for a year and a half. In the context 
of CEMAC in general and Cameroon in particular, theoretical works by Joseph 
(1996), Bekolo Ebe (1997, 1998, 2002), Okah Atenga (1998), Avom (2006), have 
not yet carried out an empirical test of the credit channel. However, Ekomane & 
Yamb (2016) analyzed the measurement of the credit channel in the CEMAC zone 
as a whole, without specifying individually the case of each country of this 
community. The aim of this study is therefore to clarify the credit channel 
operation in Cameroon which economy is the leading one of Central Africa. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Variables and data 
The main variables are: broad money supply M2, domestic credit (CRI), credit 
to the private sector (CRP), total investment (INV) and nominal GDP. The data 
come from the BEAC and IMF bases, covering a period of 52 years (1960-2012) 
and are presented in the form of a time series. 
 
3.2. Econometric instruments and techniques 
The credit channel can be summarized as follows: 
 
 PIBINVCRIM2  
 
To test the existence of the channel is to verify that this chain of causalities is 
effective. It will therefore be necessary to carry out tests of causality between M2 
and CRI, between CRI and INV, between INV and PIB. We will do this according 
to the approach of Granger (1969) and Goux (1996) that X causes Y if Y can be 
better predicted from the past of Y and X rather than from the past of Y. Formally, 
















We say that X causes Y in the sense of Granger if at least one bj is different 
from 0. After the causality tests, and according to the results of these, we will 
construct a VAR model to measure the causal relationships obtained. Given a 
vector Yt consisting of k endogenous variables representing the economy studied, 
the VAR model with k variables and p shifts, also called the autoregressive model 
of order p [Ar (p)], is presented in the form: 
 
tptpttt YYYY    ...22110  
 
If we take into account the influence of the exogenous explanatory variables, we 
will have: 
 
tmtmmttptpttt XXXYYYY    ,2,221,1122110 ......  
 
Where Xit are exogenous variables that can also be delayed. 
Finally, based on the results of the estimation of the VAR model, we will estimate 
a monetary policy transmission function, in the form of the multiple regression 
model below: 
 
tititititt PIBINVCRPCRIMPIB    ....2. 543210  
 
With i the number of years of lag that will be determined for each variable as a 
result of the causality tests and the regression coefficients to be estimated. 
 
4. Findings and discussions 
4.1. Preliminary statistical tests and causality tests 
The unit root test following Dickey & Fuller (1981), the ADF (Augmented 
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Table 1. Results of the ADF stationarity test. 
        Variables M2 CRI CRP INV PIB 
Ordre d’intégration I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(2) 
Source: Our findings. 
 
Only the investment series (INV) is stationary at level. The series M2, CRI 
and CRP are integrated in order 1, and the series PIB in order 2. Hence the need for 
the cointegration test of Johansen (1988, 1991) which gave the results in Table 2 
below. 
 





Critical Value at 
5% 




0.635157 85.41651 68.52 76.07 None ** 
0.495087 38.83038 47.21 54.46 At most 1 
0.182469 11.49562 29.68 35.65 At most 2 
0.082149 3.436980 15.41 20.04 At most 3 
0.000204 0.008150 3.76 6.65 At most 4 
Source: Our results 
Note: The stars * (**) denote the rejection of the non-cointegration hypothesis and therefore the 
acceptance of the cointegration at the level of 5% (1%) and the existence of one cointegrating 
equation (CE) is assumed. 
 
At the 1% threshold, the M2, CRI, CRP, INV and PIB series should be 
considered as cointegrated to order 1 (LR = 85.41 > critical value 68.52). There is 
therefore a stationary linear combination of these variables. This allows the 
specification of stable and long-term relationships between the different credit 
channel variables. It remains to verify the possible causal relationships between 
them. The table 3 below reports the results of the causality test. 
 
Table 3. Bivariate causality tests  
 (Null hypothesis: X does not "Granger cause"  Y) 
X/Y P (1 lag) P (2 lags) 
M2 / CRI* 





















































Source: Our results. 
Note: Bold and marked with a star are the actual and significant causalities expected. 
 
These results indicate that M2 causes domestic credit with a delay of one year. 
This means that domestic credit in Cameroon is more sensitive to monetary policy 
than other variables. The depth of the credit channel is thus domestic credit. This 
domestic credit, in turn, causes investment with a delay of one year, and investment 
causes the GDP with a delay of two years. It is concluded that the credit channel 
exists in Cameroon. Moreover, there is a direct influence of M2 on GDP, with a 
delay of two years. Similarly, the interest rate causes investment: a fall in the 
interest rate causes an increase in investment. An expansionary monetary policy 
therefore has positive effects on GDP a year later and these effects last two years, 
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subject to the control of inflation. These results confirm Brunner's (1968), 
McCallum (2008, 1990), Taylor (1995), and Feldstein & Stock (1994) findings of a 
robust and stable relationship between money supply M2 and nominal GDP. It 
therefore seems pertinent to propose a monetary policy with two final objectives: 
monetary stability and economic growth. The various tests carried out above were 
aimed at detecting causal and stable relationships between the credit channel 
variables. This objective is achieved. But the causality test gives no measure of the 
weight of the relationship. To measure this weight, we now proceed to estimate the 
VAR model taking into account the causal relationships above. 
 
4.2. Findings from the VAR test 
The VAR model to estimate is thus the following: 
 
ttttttt PIBINVCRPCRIMGDP    15241312110 2  
 
The OLS estimate gives the results in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4. VAR Results on the Credit Channel in Cameroon 
Sample : 1960  2012 
 Number of observations : 52  
 Standard deviation &  Student t Statistic (in parentheses) 
 PIB M2 CRI CRP INV 
PIB(-1)  1.567444* 0.058160 -0.000841  0.124159  7.656884 
  (0.15134)  (0.06865)  (0.08520)  (0.08848)  (18.2273) 
  (10.3569)  (0.84714) (-0.00988)  (1.40326)  (0.42008) 
M2(-1)  1.324756* 0.329188  0.614084  0.478723  0.253251 
  (0.49399)  (0.22409)  (0.27809)  (0.28880)  (59.4945) 
  (2.68176)  (5.93147)  (2.20826)  (1.65764)  (0.00426) 
CRP(-1)  0.003633* 0.293811  0.637895  1.096771  6.298438 
  (0.39839)  (0.18073)  (0.22427)  (0.23291)  (47.9813) 
  (0.00912)  (1.62573)  (2.84430)  (4.70899)  (0.13127) 
INV(-1)  0.002259* 0.001350 -0.000446  0.000930 -0.204702 
  (0.00152)  (0.00069)  (0.00086)  (0.00089)  (0.18302) 
  (1.48685)  (1.95797) (-0.52184)  (1.04737) (-1.11848) 
C  56.15214* 13.67725  13.18606  25.20111  97.34512 
  (41.8780)  (18.9974)  (23.5748)  (24.4829)  (5043.66) 
  (1.34085)  (0.71996)  (0.55933)  (1.02934)  (0.01930) 
 R2  0.997716  0.984924  0.977099  0.956338  0.332327 
 Adjusted R2   0.996928  0.979725  0.969202  0.941282  0.102094 
Source: Author. 
 
The estimated VAR is therefore as follows: 
 








The VAR generates interesting explanatory relationships between the nominal 
GDP and the monetary policy transmission variables, thus confirming the different 
causalities established above:  
 
M2↑ → CRP↑ → INV↑ → GDP↑. 
 
This relation establishes the influence or not of the central bank on production 
through the channel of bank credit. This model allows to target the GDP by the 
monetary policy is indicated here by the variations of the aggregate M2, while 
taking into account the transmission of such a policy by means of the credit as 
revealed by the test of causality. The selected credit aggregate is the one-year credit 
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extended to the private sector (CRP) t-1. Regarding investment, although the 
causality test was only significant for the two-year delayed investment (INVt-2), 
the VAR test completes this result by revealing a positive correlation of GDP with l 
Delayed investment of one year (INVt-1). This induces a GDP reaction with a 
small magnitude indicated by a coefficient of 0.002. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to assess the functioning of the credit channel in the 
transmission of the effects of monetary policy in Cameroon. In addition to the 
literature review, the analysis was conducted in a macroeconomic approach using 
time series as part of VAR modeling. It appears that the credit channel operates in 
Cameroon, but with limits. Indeed, the different successive causalities expected 
between the variables of transmission of the monetary policy are established, in 
particular between the money supply M2, the domestic credit, the investment and 
the real GDP. In addition, the VAR analysis revealed an interesting relationship 
between GDP and macroeconomic monetary and financial variables representative 
of the transmission of monetary policy. With regard to the delay, it is two years. 
However, a conclusive causality test on the chain of monetary policy transmission 
variables does not guarantee the fluidity of the credit channel in Cameroon. Indeed, 
it hides many limitations linked in particular to the weak influence of the issuing 
institution on the behavior of secondary banks in terms of credit supply. This is 
particularly true of credit to the private sector, as evidenced by the lack of causality 
between the money supply and credit to the private sector. The opportunistic 
behavior of borrowers and the risk aversion of banks have often made it difficult to 
finance the economy through credit. In the future, the BEAC's influence on the 
behavior of secondary banks should be strengthened by restoring it part of the 
authority abolished by the financial liberalization of the early 1990s (administration 
and credit selectivity). This renewal of authority would make it possible to steer 
credit towards productive growth sectors. It also appears necessary to extend the 
credit channel by consolidating the financial markets of the zone and by creating 
new specialized financial institutions. Public action aimed at minimizing the 
perverse effects of the opportunistic behavior of borrowers and banks that have 
made the offer of bank credit in Cameroon chilly would also be necessary. 
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